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I. INTRODUCTION
Early one morning, a 19-year-old woman sits peacefully in her sedan in a
parking lot. Out of nowhere, a construction truck slams into her passenger side,
lifting the car three feet off the ground, crushing part of the door, and exploding
one tire. Paramedics treat the woman at the scene, but decide she does not need
to see a physician. Soon after, back pain begins and within a few weeks, medi-
cal specialists diagnose a myriad of medical problems, including a hip contu-
sion, a height decrease, and spinal injuries. Devastated by the mounting
medical costs, the victim sues to recover damages for negligence against the
construction company who owns the truck.
At trial, the injured woman’s medical experts testify that the accident
caused her back injuries. However, the trucking company presents its own
expert testimony. Specifically, a biomechanical engineer testifies that the con-
struction truck did not hit the victim’s sedan with enough force to cause her
injuries. The engineer makes this opinion based on a photograph of the sedan,
despite having no actual knowledge of the crash’s physics including the vehi-
cles’ starting points, speeds, or collision angles, or the distances between the
vehicles before impact. After deliberation, the jury finds the construction com-
pany one hundred percent at fault for the accident, but only awards the injured
woman enough money to cover her special damages. The award is inadequate
to pay for future medical care or compensate for pain and suffering. During the
appeal process, the plaintiff passes away and does not live to see justice.
Unfortunately, this situation is all too common.1 A jurisdiction’s expert
witness standard can have an enormous impact and practical ramifications in
criminal or civil trials within the federal or state context.2 Every day, litigants
use experts at trial to prove elements such as causation, to establish standards of
* Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2012, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of
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Professor Sara Gordon, Tim Mott, Robert Opdyke, Kammi Rencher, Cayla Witty, and the
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1 See Hallmark v. Eldridge, 189 P.3d 646, 649–50 (Nev. 2008) (containing very similar
facts and procedural history to narration).
2 See Geoffrey White, Admitting Scientific Evidence: Exploring the Ramifications of the
Nevada Supreme Court’s Rejection of the Daubert Doctrine, NEV. LAW., May 1999, at 30,
32 (explaining the impact of an admissibility standard on various parties and causation
issues).
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care, to calculate damages, and to connect suspects to an accident’s scene,
among other important case functions.3 The admittance of unfounded expert
witness testimony, or the exclusion of legitimate expert testimony, can be dev-
astating.4 Admittance or exclusion of expert testimony can even change the
outcome of a trial.5 A proper expert witness standard finds a balance between
consistency and flexibility, respecting that jurisdiction’s rules of evidence while
avoiding a “free for all” that admits junk science.6
This Note argues that Nevada’s expert witness admissibility standard, as
set out in Higgs v. State,7 will result in unpredictable and inconsistent applica-
tion. Part II discusses the historical development of expert testimony admit-
tance standards by first outlining the federal standard from Frye8 to the
Daubert trilogy.9 It then shifts focus to expert witness admissibility in state
courts, specifically in Missouri and North Dakota, two states whose legislatures
provided statutes to define admissibility standards distinct from the evolving
case law. Next, it takes an in-depth look at the evolution of Nevada’s modern
admissibility standard, focusing on the foundational cases: Yamaha,10 Dow
Chemical,11 Banks,12 and Hallmark.13 Part III outlines the Supreme Court of
Nevada’s holding and rationales in Higgs. Part IV focuses on the weaknesses
and ramifications of Nevada’s expert witness standard as defined in Higgs. It
then proposes the Nevada Legislature amend NRS 50.275 with additional con-
ditions that incorporate the Court’s objectives as set out in Higgs. Finally, this
Note concludes that the Supreme Court of Nevada must provide even further
clarification and guidance to Nevada’s lower courts and practitioners as to the
application of the recently re-affirmed expert witness standard to allow for
3 Edward K. Cheng, Independent Judicial Research in the Daubert Age, 56 DUKE L.J. 1263,
1265 (2007).
4 Jeffrey W. Stempel, Expert Witnesses: The Nevada Supreme Court Clarifies Adherence to
NRS 50.275 and Judicial Discretion, Expressly Declining to Embrace the Federal Daubert
Approach, NEV. LAW., Oct. 2010, at 10, 11 (discussing how “the successful evidentiary
movant (usually a defendant) has often been able to prevail on summary judgment because
of the claimant’s inability to use expert testimony to establish a genuine factual dispute as to
defectiveness, causation or some other necessary element of a claim”).
5 Cheng, supra note 3, at 1265.
6 See Alma Kelley McLeod, Commentary, Is Frye Dying or is Daubert Doomed? Determin-
ing the Standard of Admissibility of Scientific Evidence in Alabama Courts, 51 ALA. L. REV.
883, 905 (2000) (examining Alabama’s options in adopting the Frye standard, Daubert, or
neither); see also Note, Admitting Doubt: A New Standard for Scientific Evidence, 123
HARV. L. REV. 2021, 2028 (2010) [hereinafter Note, Admitting Doubt] (explaining how
“‘Daubert is not supposed to be a methodological handbook for good science; it is supposed
to set out a standard for good adjudication’” (quoting Brian Leiter, The Epistemology of
Admissibility: Why Even Good Philosophy of Science Would Not Make for Good Philosophy
of Evidence, BYU L. REV. 803, 817 (1997))).
7 Higgs v. State, 222 P.3d 648 (Nev. 2010).
8 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
9 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522
U.S. 136 (1997); Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
10 Yamaha Motor Co., U.S.A. v. Arnoult, 955 P.2d 661 (Nev. 1998).
11 Dow Chem. Co. v. Mahlum, 970 P.2d 98 (Nev. 1998), modified on other grounds by
GES, Inc. v. Corbitt, 21 P.3d 11 (Nev. 2001).
12 Banks ex rel. Banks v. Sunrise Hosp., 102 P.3d 52 (Nev. 2004).
13 Hallmark v. Eldridge, 189 P.3d 646 (Nev. 2008).
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more predictability and consistency. Further, the Nevada Legislature should
amend NRS 50.27514 to provide a framework that incorporates the objectives
set out in Higgs.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF EXPERT WITNESS STANDARDS
Until Frye was decided in 1923, the law made no specific distinctions
between types of expert testimony in regards to admissibility.15 For expert tes-
timony to be admissible, evidence had to be relevant, difficult enough for the
average juror to need the assistance of an expert, and neither overly prejudicial
nor time consuming.16 The doctrinal basis for evaluating expert testimony
became more rigorous and courts felt the pressure for specialized rules of evi-
dence.17  The judiciary system realized that scientific evidence posed special
problems, and courts felt pressure to create a more heightened scrutiny.18
A. Federal Admissibility Standards: “Gatekeepers” Replace “General
Acceptance”
Following the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia’s decision in
Frye v. United States, scientific expert testimony was only admissible if the
scientific principle had gained “general acceptance” in its field.19 For example,
in Frye, the Court held the expert testimony regarding the results of a systolic
blood pressure deception (polygraph) test to be inadmissible because the test
had not gained general acceptance within the relevant scientific fields.20
For the next 70 years, standards varied among the circuits regarding the
application of Frye,21 with the majority of federal courts following the Frye
test.22 The Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE), passed in the 1970s, led to a re-
evaluation of the continued relevance of Frye in federal courts.23 In the 1990s,
the rules changed as the United States Supreme Court addressed concerns about
the admittance of “junk science,” especially in complex cases.24 Some exam-
ples of areas where there had been admission concerns were actions involving
product liability including pharmaceuticals, pollution, and medical
malpractice.”25
14 NEV. REV. STAT. § 50.275 (2009) (added in 1971 and taken from Draft Federal Rule
702).
15 D.H. Kaye, The Dynamics of Daubert: Methodology, Conclusions, and Fit in Statistical
and Econometric Studies, 87 VA. L. REV. 1933, 1938 (2001).
16 Id.
17 Id. at 1943–44.
18 Id. at 1944.
19 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding that scientific expert
evidence must be somewhere in the “twilight zone” where the evidential principle is
recognized).
20 Id.
21 Cassandra H. Welch, Note, Flexible Standards, Deferential Review: Daubert’s Legacy of
Confusion, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1085, 1086–87 (2006) (discussing the historical
development of expert witness testimony as established in Frye).
22 Stempel, supra note 4, at 10.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 11.
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In 1993, the United States Supreme Court changed the landscape of expert
testimony admissibility by giving trial court judges a much larger role in
evaluation of proposed expert testimony.26 In Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Court sought to align the admittance of scientific
expert testimony in a federal trial with FRE 702, which superseded the predated
Frye.27 Daubert held that nothing in the drafting history of FRE 702 referred to
the necessity of “general acceptance” for admissibility, and such a prerequisite
would clash with the “liberal thrust” of the Federal Rules.28 The Court
addressed limits on the admissibility of scientific evidence, specifically stating
that evidence must be both relevant and reliable.29 The Court expressed its
confidence in federal justices’ abilities to undertake review and gave a non-
comprehensive list of factors that judges may consider.30 Cross-examination
and proper instructions regarding the burden of proof remained the appropriate
ways to address questionable, yet admissible, evidence.31 The core of Daubert
was that trial court judges “can — and must — decide whether proffered scien-
tific testimony is based on the scientific method without taking a position
regarding the truth of particular scientific conclusions.”32
The Daubert decision advised judges to focus on principles and methodol-
ogy, instead of conclusions, when deciding whether to admit expert testi-
mony.33 The premise was that conclusions, but not methods, are “inherently
corrigible.”34 Because there are no certainties in science, “a body of established
truths” cannot establish science.35 The idea is that “the scientific method is
itself scientifically uncontroversial,” and when judges focus on this method, it
allows them to avoid taking a side on scientific issues while still determining
whether the expert testimony amounts to “scientific knowledge.”36 Still, judges
have the daunting task of resolving disagreements among qualified scientists
about whether a theory or technique is “scientific.”37 Judges must also reach
their decision aside from personal bias or beliefs.38
26 Note, Reliable Evaluation of Expert Testimony, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2142, 2143 (2003)
[ hereinafter Note, Reliable Evaluation].
27 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993).
28 Id. at 588.
29 Id. at 589.
30 Factors for consideration include whether the theory can be (and has been) tested, has
been subjected to peer review, the known or potential rate of error, and if the theory has a
widespread or general degree of acceptance. Id. at 593–94.
31 Id. at 596. The Daubert decision has been the basis for countless commentary. See, e.g.,
1 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF
EXPERT TESTIMONY §1:7–40 (2010–2011).
32 Adina Schwartz, A “Dogma of Empiricism” Revisited: Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and the Need to Resurrect the Philosophical Insight of Frye v. United
States, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 149, 157 (1997).
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 158.
38 Id.
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In his partial dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed concern that the
majority’s reach may have exceeded its grasp39 in imposing increased gate-
keeper responsibilities that may obligate judges to “become amateur scien-
tists.”40 Rehnquist explained that determining whether scientific knowledge
can and has been tested required an understanding of scientific knowledge and
terms, which other judges, much like himself, may not truly possess.41 Rehn-
quist also was apprehensive that judges would apply the listed factors strictly
despite the majority’s mandate for flexible application, which could result in
possible confusion and misapplication.42
When the Supreme Court remanded to the Ninth Circuit, Judge Kozinski
was equally skeptical about applying the newly defined standard, and the Court
eventually held inadmissible the expert testimony that pills had caused the
plaintiff’s birth defects.43 Kozinski stated that “Daubert puts federal judges in
an uncomfortable position”44 in requiring them to decide whether testimony is
based on “good science” or is derived from a “scientific method.”45 The very
expert whose testimony a judge would rule on likely has far superior scientific
knowledge, making the judge’s responsibility a daunting one.46
Commentators have noted that a thorough Daubert review is not “realisti-
cally implementable.”47 One study that surveyed four hundred state court
judges found that the majority supported a “gatekeeping role” when it came to
determining expert testimony admissibility.48 The same study exposed data
regarding how prepared judges are for that role of assessing the validity and
reliability of scientific evidence.49 Of the judges surveyed, 52 percent believed
their education left them adequately prepared to deal with the range of scien-
tific evidence proffered within their courtrooms.50 While 63 percent of the
judges had received some type of CLE training regarding the courtroom usage
of certain kinds of scientific evidence, 96 percent had never received education
about general scientific methods and principles.51 When it came to peer review,
71 percent understood applying the scientific concept.52 In contrast, only 6 per-
39 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 599 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that there is no reference to “reliability” in FRE
702, yet the majority had concluded that “reliability” and “relevance” were the “touch-
stones” of expert witness admissibility).
40 Id. at 600–01.
41 Id. at 600.
42 Id. at 598.
43 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1322 (9th Cir. 1995).
44 Id. at 1315.
45 Id. at 1316 (Kozinski expressed a greater concern in evaluating cutting-edge research
“where fact meets theory and certainty dissolves into probability,” yet a judge must resolve
disagreements between highly qualified scientists when there may be no consensus on the
matter at hand.).
46 Id.
47 Note, Admitting Doubt, supra note 6, at 2030.
48 Sophia I. Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey of Judges on Judg-
ing Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 433, 443 (2001).
49 Id. at 452.
50 Id. at 442.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 447.
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cent of judges surveyed truly understood the concept of falsifiability, and 4
percent clearly understood how to apply the concept of error rate.53 Addition-
ally, judges may underestimate the role their own biases play in admissibility
decisions when placed in a position with such discretion to assess facts and
resolve scientific discrepancies.54
Subsequent expert testimony cases further defined the federal standard.
General Electric Co. v. Joiner established the abuse of discretion standard for
review of decisions regarding the admissibility of scientific expert testimony.55
Two years later, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael extended the flexible Daubert
standard to all expert testimony.56 This meant a judge’s general “gatekeeping”
duties in federal court would apply to testimony based on “technical” or “spe-
cialized” knowledge as well as “scientific” knowledge.57
Many have criticized the Daubert trilogy for numerous reasons. First, the
federal standard may raise legitimate concerns over fairness because the costly
Daubert hearings favor the more affluent party.58 Additionally, “science and
law treat error types differently: law tends to be indifferent between false posi-
tive and false negatives, while many scientific studies seek to limit false posi-
tives, permitting more false negatives.”59 In other words, a false positive would
include an erroneous finding of causation when none actually exists, and a false
negative would include erroneous findings of no causation when one truly does
exist.60 These differences may create a bias against finding causality in tort
cases.61 Scholars have also argued that judges are more likely to admit expert
witness testimony that is pro-prosecution than pro-defendant in criminal cases,
creating a bias against criminal defendants.62
Other difficulties exist because of the differences between legal and scien-
tific fact-finding. For example, legal fact-finding is concerned with using an
expert’s knowledge to help a jury find justice within the facts of a particular
case.63 In contrast, scientific fact-finding seeks universal truth that can be com-
pletely separated from the context producing the particular result.64 Law and
53 Id. at 444–47.
54 Note, Admitting Doubt, supra note 6, at 2031.
55 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 143 (1997). A federal trial judge’s “gatekeeping”
discretion is evident in three separate matters. Note, Reliable Evaluation, supra note 26, at
2146. First, as far as reliability analysis, a trial judge has discretion to decide the issue on the
briefs alone, witness voir dire, or by holding an evidentiary hearing. Id. Second, a trial
judge’s substantive discretion comes from the ability to decide which factors are pertinent in
evaluating a particular expertise. Id. Last, a trial judge’s most powerful discretion is in mak-
ing the ultimate decision on admissibility. Id. A Circuit Court of Appeals may well have
reached a different conclusion on the same expert, but may find the lower court’s decision
within its discretion. Id.
56 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999).
57 Id.
58 Note, Admitting Doubt, supra note 6, at 2031.
59 Id.
60 A. Leah Vickers, Daubert, Critique and Interpretation: What Empirical Studies Tell Us
About the Application of Daubert, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 109, 122 (2005).
61 Note, Admitting Doubt, supra note 6, at 2031.
62 Id. at 2032.
63 Id.
64 Id.
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science also treat determining truth differently, with the legal world relying on
“zealous advocacy — within certain ethical bounds — to reach conclusions”
and the scientific community relying on “an organized skepticism model based
on critical peer review.”65
Daubert also drew criticism regarding the ambiguity in the Supreme
Court’s language, which left lower courts guessing as to when and how to
apply the four considerations.66 For example, those states that applied the
Daubert considerations did so inconsistently, deeming them as anywhere from
rigid to flexible factors,67 while other states, including Nevada, rejected such
application, finding existing state case law on expert testimony sufficient to
handle admissibility.68
B. Expert Witness Admissibility in State Courts
In state courts, the landscape of opinions on expert admissibility standards
is divided and constantly changing. In 2001, 25 states used the Daubert analy-
sis or a similar test, 15 states and the District of Columbia still used the Frye
test, 6 states had not rejected Frye but had incorporated a Daubert-like analy-
sis, and 4 states had developed their own test.69 Just five years later in 2006, 30
states had adopted Daubert or deemed it consistent, 14 states had rejected
Daubert (including Nevada), and 7 states neither accepted nor rejected
Daubert.70 By 2010, 31 states and the Military Courts were Daubert or
Daubert leaning states, 17 states had rejected Daubert, and 2 states looked to
Daubert concepts but relied on their own laws.71 The previous statistics did not
reflect the impact of Higgs, which placed Nevada in a more distinctive cate-
gory: a state that rejects both Daubert and Frye, yet relies on its own laws.72
65 Id.
66 Welch, supra note 21, at 1091.
67 Id.
68 White, supra note 2, at 32 (citing Dow Chem. Co. v. Mahlum, 970 P.2d 98, 108 (Nev.
1998), modified on other grounds by GES, Inc. v. Corbitt, 21 P.3d 11 (Nev. 2001)).
69 Alice B. Lustre, Annotation, Post-Daubert Standards for Admissibility of Scientific and
Other Expert Evidence in State Courts, 90 A.L.R.5th 453, 481 (2001).
70 See generally Martin S. Kaufman, The Status of Daubert in State Courts (Nov. 7, 2006),
http://www.atlanticlegal.org/daubertreport.pdf.
71 1 TERENCE W. CAMPBELL & DEMOSTHENES LORANDOS, CROSS EXAMINING EXPERTS IN
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES § 1:16.1 (2010). Campbell & Lorados describe those states yet to
adopt Daubert as having “been sentenced by their Supreme Courts to wallow in the 1920s
with a hopelessly out dated philosophy of science.” Id. Daubert and “Daubert leaning”
states include: Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana,
Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Id. at
n.6. States either rejecting Daubert or continuing to use Frye: Alabama, Arizona, California,
Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Nevada,
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Washington and Wisconsin. Id. at n.7.  The
law update categorized Missouri and North Dakota as the only two states that rely on their
own law. Id. at n.8.
72 Following Higgs v. State, Nevada is similar to Missouri and North Dakota because it too
relies on its own laws. See Higgs v. State, 222 P.3d 648, 655–59 (Nev. 2010); see infra Part
IV.
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C. Missouri and North Dakota: States that Rely on Their Own Expert
Witness Statutes
To understand the realistic options for the future of Nevada’s expert
admissibility standard, it helps to look at other states that rely on their own
regulations and case law. In Missouri, neither Frye nor Daubert controls a state
court’s admission of expert testimony in civil cases.73 Missouri Revised Stat-
utes (MRS) section 490.065 is the controlling standard,74 and it states:
1. In any civil action, if scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
2. Testimony by such an expert witness in the form of an opinion or inference other-
wise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be
decided by the trier of fact.
3. The facts or data in a particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing
and must be of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field in forming
opinions or inferences upon the subject and must be otherwise reasonably reliable.
4. If a reasonable foundation is laid, an expert may testify in terms of opinion or
inference and give the reasons therefor without the use of hypothetical questions,
unless the court believes the use of a hypothetical question will make the expert’s
opinion more understandable or of greater assistance to the jury due to the particular
facts of the case.75
Only portions of subsections (1) through (3) mirror the Federal Rules of
Evidence,76 and the Missouri Legislature created the rest of the statute.77 Com-
mentators note that the Supreme Court of Missouri intended MRS 490.065 to
73 McGuire v. Seltsam, 138 S.W.3d 718, 720 n.3 (Mo. 2004).
74 Id. at 720; State Bd. of Registration for Healing Arts v. McDonagh, 123 S.W.3d 146, 153
(Mo. 2003). “Forget Frye. Forget Daubert. Read the statute. Section 490.065 is written,
conveniently, in English. It has 204 words. Those straightforward statutory words are all you
really need to know about the admissibility of expert testimony in civil proceedings.” Id. at
160 (Wolff, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnote omitted).
75 MO. ANN. STAT. § 490.065 (West 1996).
76 See FED. R. EVID. 702–04.
77 See Care & Treatment of T.D. v. State, 199 S.W.3d 223, 227 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (citing
Goddard v. State, 144 S.W.3d 848, 854 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004)) (“The legislature recognized
that it was inconsistent to allow experts to rely on hearsay while practicing their profession,
but not let them rely on hearsay when rendering their opinion in court, unless substantial
time and money were expended to bring those facts forth and put in evidence. It remedied
this inconsistency by enacting section 490.065.3.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 22A
WILLIAM A. SCHROEDER, MISSOURI PRACTICE SERIES, MISSOURI EVIDENCE § 703.1 (3d ed.)
(citing Hopkins, Expert Testimony, New Rules, New Questions, 46 J.MO.BAR 175, 176
(1990)) (observing that “[p]rior to the enactment of section [490.065] (3), Missouri practice
permitted an expert to testify to opinions based upon admissible evidence made known to the
expert in three different manners: (1) facts perceived by the expert, (2) facts made known to
the expert at trial, and (3) assumed facts supported by the evidence.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). For an overview of the expert witness standard in Missouri, see Jaime M.
Nies, Note, Say Goodbye to Frye: Missouri Supreme Court Clarifies Standard for Admitting
Expert Testimony in Civil and Administrative Cases, 69 MO. L. REV. 1203 (2004).
Fall 2011] UNPREDICTABLE AND INCONSISTENT 195
be a meaningful standard for trial court judges to assess expert witness
testimony.78
Currently, Missouri trial courts have “sound discretion” in determining
whether experts in a particular field used data or facts reasonably or if that
particular methodology is “reasonably reliable.”79 An appellate court will only
find that the trial court abused its discretion when a decision is against logic
and is so “arbitrary and unreasonable” that it indicates a lack of considera-
tion.80 Although Missouri court judges have enormous discretion, they will
refuse to admit expert testimony when experts base opinions on assumptions
not supported in the evidence.81 For example, in McGuire v. Seltsam, the
Supreme Court of Missouri found that a forensic psychiatrist’s expert testimony
about a motorist’s alleged somatization disorder was inadmissible in a personal
injury action.82 The psychiatrist based her diagnosis, which was that the motor-
ist’s earlier medical records would have contained notes pertaining to somatic
complaints, on “speculation and conjecture” not supported by the evidence.83
Similarly, in North Dakota, neither Frye nor Daubert control a trial
court’s admission of expert testimony.84 Rule 702 of the North Dakota Rules of
Evidence (NDRE) governs expert testimony and states, “If scientific, technical,
or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the
form of an opinion or otherwise.”85
Although NDRE 702 is identical to the early form of FRE 702,86 North
Dakota trial court judges have “sound discretion” in determining whether an
expert is qualified.87 NDRE 702 “envisions generous allowance” of the admit-
tance of expert testimony for witnesses who show some degree of expertise in
the area that they wish to testify, but expert testimony must also be reliable and
relevant.88 If an expert’s knowledge, training, education, and experience will
assist the trier of fact, the expert does not have to be a specialist or certified in a
very specialized field.89 Only when the trial court “acts in an arbitrary, unrea-
sonable, or unconscionable manner” or “misapplies the law” will the decision
be reversed as an abuse of discretion.90
78 Michael D. Murphy & Ross D. McFerron, Expert Challenges in Missouri Civil Cases
After McDonagh, 64 J. MO. B. 86, 92 (2008).
79 McGuire, 138 S.W.3d at 720–21.
80 Id. at 720.
81 Id. at 722.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 See Hamilton v. Oppen, 653 N.W.2d 678, 683 (N.D. 2002) (noting the use of NDRE 702
and subsequent state court decisions to guide court decisions regarding the admissibility of
expert testimony).
85 N.D. R. EVID. 702.
86 The Supreme Court amended FRE 702 following Daubert in 1993, yet NDRE 702
remains purposely identical to the prior version of FRE 702. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (as
amended on Apr. 17, 2000).
87 Hamilton, 653 N.W.2d at 683.
88 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
89 State v. Hernandez, 707 N.W.2d 449, 453 (N.D. 2005).
90 Id. at 454.
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Commentators call North Dakota’s stance on expert testimony “extremely
liberal,” and note that the Supreme Court of North Dakota has “more faith in
the jury system” than do the federal courts.91 If an expert has appropriate cre-
dentials, trial court judges will be more prone to admissibility as North Dakota
still follows the earlier pre-Daubert readings of FRE 702, which allow broad
use of witnesses who have some degree of expertise in their field.92
North Dakota is not alone in its resiliency in making its own decisions
regarding the adoption of federal rules or standards.  Other states have laws that
differ significantly from Daubert and Frye. Nevada has also set its own path.
D. The Evolution of Nevada’s Modern Expert Witness Admissibility
Standard
Nevada never expressly adopted the “general acceptance” standard as set
out in Frye.93 Following the adoption of the FRE, Nevada chose to regulate
admissibility by statute, specifically NRS 50.275.94 NRS 50.275 closely mir-
rors the language of FRE 702 before it was amended in response to the Daubert
trilogy.95 In spite of this similarity, Nevada remained independent from federal
jurisprudence by using a rule that granted trial courts broad discretion.96 How-
ever, in Nevada, much like in federal court, the applicable standard of review is
the abuse of discretion standard.97 Thus, a district court’s discretion in follow-
ing NRS 50.275 must be “manifestly wrong” in order for the Supreme Court of
Nevada to reverse—and generally the district court is in a better position to
judge testimony with regard to material facts.98
E. Nevada Cases Setting the Stage for Higgs
The Supreme Court of Nevada had several notable opportunities to
address admissibility standards prior to its most recent discussion in Higgs v.
State. In Yamaha Motor Co., U.S.A. v. Arnoult, a products liability and negli-
gence suit, the Supreme Court held that the trial court had not abused its discre-
tion in admitting expert testimony regarding the adequacy of safety warnings
within an owner’s manual for an all-terrain vehicle.99 The Yamaha, a four-
wheel all-terrain vehicle, flipped forward when only moving half its maximum
speed and catastrophically injured the plaintiff.100 The expert, who had a doc-
torate and masters in industrial engineering, testified that while the Yamaha’s
owner’s manual contained adequate warnings about the possibility of flipping
backward in certain situations, those warnings did not adequately alert the
91 Expert Witness, THE BUCKLIN ORG., http://www.bucklin.org/research/NDexpertWitness.
htm (last visited Dec. 5, 2011).
92 Id.
93 Stempel, supra note 4, at 10–11.
94 Id. at 10.
95 Id.; see infra Part IV.B (analyzing the text of NRS 50.275).
96 Brian Irvine, Note, Waiting for Daubert: The Nevada Supreme Court and the Admissibil-
ity of Expert Testimony, 2 NEV. L.J. 158, 162–63 (2002).
97 Thompson v. State, 221 P.3d 708, 713 (Nev. 2009).
98 Id. at 713–14 (internal quotation marks omitted).
99 Yamaha Motor Co., U.S.A. v. Arnoult, 955 P.2d 661, 668 (Nev. 1998).
100 Id. at 664.
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driver to the possibility of flipping forward.101 The jury awarded the plaintiff
over three million in damages, basing liability on a failure to warn.102 Yamaha
appealed, arguing that the trial court failed its “gatekeeping” duty by admitting
opinion testimony that the expert had not based on scientific evidence.103 The
Supreme Court of Nevada made clear that “[t]o date, we have not adopted the
Daubert test” and the expert had adequate credentials to testify as to the suffi-
ciency of warnings.104 The Court’s rationale seemed to hinge on finding that
the assessment of the warnings involved “specialized knowledge” that could
require expertise, even if it did not implicate any “laws of science.”105 Because
the evaluation of the manual required specialized knowledge, it mirrored the
language NRS 50.275 called for.106 Under the abuse of discretion standard, the
Supreme Court of Nevada was hesitant to disturb the trial court’s “sound dis-
cretion in determining the competency of an expert witness.”107
In Dow Chemical Co. v. Mahlum, the Supreme Court of Nevada once
again used NRS 50.275 as the admissibility standard regarding a causation
issue in a fraud and negligence suit involving ruptured silicone breast
implants.108 The plaintiff, Mahlum, had received breast implants as part of
reconstructive surgery following a mastectomy.109 A few years later, Mahlum’s
health began to worsen and, after an implant ruptured, surgeons surgically
removed both implants.110 Unfortunately, the surgeon was unable to remove all
of the silicone that had leaked from the ruptured implant and it remained rooted
in Mahlum’s muscles, tissue, and blood vessels.111 Later, Mahlum filed suit
alleging that the ruptured implant had caused her to contract an uncommon
autoimmune disease.112 The jury returned a verdict against Dow Chemical, the
101 Id. at 667–68.
102 Id. at 664.
103 Id. at 667.
104 Id. In addition, numerous corporations had previously enlisted the same expert in the
past. Id. at 668.
105 Id. at 667. At this point in time, the Supreme Court had not yet decided Kumho Tire Co.
v. Carmichael, which extended the Daubert standard to all expert testimony. See Kumho
Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999).
106 Yamaha, 955 P.2d at 667. The Supreme Court of Nevada restated the threshold for
admissibility as turning “on whether the expert’s specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact in understanding the evidence or an issue in dispute.” Id. (citing Townsend v. State,
734 P.2d 705, 708 (Nev. 1987)).
107 Id. at 668.
108 Dow Chem. Co. v. Mahlum, 970 P.2d 98, 107 (Nev. 1998), modified on other grounds
by GES, Inc. v. Corbitt, 21 P.3d 11 (Nev. 2001).
109 Dow Chem., 970 P.2d at 106. The Silastic II implants contained a clear outer shell of
silicone rubber. Id. Dow Corning had marketed and manufactured the Silastic II implant
alone, although Dow Corning was professionally intertwined with Dow Chemical, who did
quality inspections and could “approve or disapprove any products manufactured, distributed
or sold under the Dow Chemical trademark.” Id. at 105.
110 Id. at 106.
111 Id.
112 Id. Specifically, one doctor testified that Mahlum’s symptoms were consistent with
“multiple-sclerosis-like autoimmune disease, axonal neuropathy, and demyelinization, all of
which are caused by antibodies attacking her nervous system.” Id. at 108. Another doctor
testified that breast implants could cause “atypical autoimmune disease” characterized by
“symptoms of fatigue, joint and muscle pain, sleep disturbances, hair loss, skin rashes, dry-
ness of the eyes and mouth, and numbness or tingling in [the] hands and feet.” Id. at 109.
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implant manufacturer, in excess of 14 million dollars.113 Dow Chemical
appealed on several grounds, and argued that the court had improperly denied
its motion for a new trial on the grounds of erroneous admission of expert
witness testimony regarding the causation issue.114
The Supreme Court of Nevada upheld the judgment against Dow Chemi-
cal on the negligent performance claim and held that the trial court did not err
in denying a motion for a new trial.115 Mahlum provided causation evidence,
critical to a negligent performance claim, in the form of expert testimony,
which the trial court properly certified.116 Of the three experts, the most contro-
versial was a rheumatologist who concluded that the ruptured breast implants
caused Mahlum’s symptoms; this testimony was based on the rheumatologist’s
treatment of Mahlum and over one hundred other women with silicone breast
implants.117 One commentator pointed out that the rheumatologist’s testimony
would have likely failed Daubert’s reliability test, as the rheumatologist’s
findings had not been published or otherwise subjected to peer review, her
methods were not generally accepted, and where the conclusions had not yet
been tested, no error rate had been established.118
The Supreme Court of Nevada acknowledged that causation was a scien-
tifically controversial component of Mahlum’s breast implant case, but it held
that Mahlum did not have to wait until the scientific community had developed
a consensus of whether ruptured silicone implants caused her disease.119 It rec-
ognized that if Mahlum were forced to wait, she may not be able to recover
because of the doctrine of laches and statute of limitations, and it also noted
that the case “was not tried in the court of scientific opinion, but before a jury
of her peers.”120 The jury properly considered the evidence under the prepon-
derance of evidence standard and concluded that silicone had caused Mahlum’s
autoimmune disease.121 The Court found substantial causation evidence
because the standard of proof that guides a jury is lower than the standard of
proof for declaring truth in science.122
After Dow Chemical, at least one commentator argued that the Supreme
Court of Nevada should completely adopt Daubert because the state courts
needed the same degree of predictability or reliability as federal courts.123 A
Nevada state court was likely to look into the qualifications of a witness rather
than a scientific basis and leave the less qualified jury to decide credibility.124
The liberal rules allowed experts to put forth opinions that science had not
tested and data did not support.125 The Supreme Court of Nevada could instead
113 Id. at 106.
114 Id. at 106–07.
115 Id. at 107.
116 Id. at 107–08.
117 Id. at 109.
118 Irvine, supra note 96, at 169.
119 Dow Chem., 970 P.2d at 109.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 See Irvine, supra note 96, at 160.
124 Id. at 165.
125 Id. at 176 (commenting that the Nevada rules are more “liberal” than the federal rules).
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“insulate the jury from flawed science” if, in cases like Dow Chemical, the
Court gave proper guidelines to the trial court for examining methodology.126
In 2004, a case would further complicate the admissibility standard in
Nevada state courts. In Banks ex rel. Banks v. Sunrise Hospital, the Supreme
Court of Nevada affirmed the trial court’s judgment and held that the witness
did not need to base testimony on a reasonable degree of medical certainty
regarding the malfunctioning of anesthesia equipment during a patient’s sur-
gery.127 In addition, the particular facts warranted testimony from an expert
concerning calculating hedonic loss.128 The plaintiff in Banks was a 51-year-
old patient who had gone into cardiac arrest during a rotator cuff surgery at
Sunrise Hospital.129 During the surgery, the plaintiff was connected to a
Narkomed II anesthesia machine, which was designed to provide oxygen and
anesthetic agents to patients.130 During the surgery, doctors noticed a decrease
in Banks’s blood pressure and unsuccessfully increased oxygen, administered
Robinal (to increase heart rate), and twice administered ephedrine to increase
pulse rate.131 Physicians, including a cardiologist, then attempted to shock
Banks’s heart rate back to a normal rhythm multiple times, attempted cardi-
opulmonary resuscitation, and administered atropine before finally getting the
heart back to a normal rhythm.132 Tragically, Banks did not regain conscious-
ness following the surgery and remained in a “permanent vegetative state.”133
Sunrise prepared an occurrence report that made no mention of errors involving
the anesthesia equipment, and Sunrise later sold the anesthesia equipment used
during Banks’s surgery along with other equipment to the same buyer.134
Within a year, Banks’s guardian brought negligence claims against multi-
ple defendants, including Sunrise Hospital.135 More than two years after first
filing the claims, and nearly four years after the incident, Banks’s guardian
amended the complaint to assert an additional claim for negligence pertaining
to the maintenance of the anesthesia equipment.136 Prior to trial, Banks had
sought sanctions based on Sunrise’s failure to preserve the anesthesia equip-
ment used during Banks’s surgery.137 The district court determined that Sunrise
had spoiled the evidence by failing to identify the specific equipment from
Banks’s surgery before selling the equipment and gave an instruction to the
jury that indicated it could infer that if Sunrise had preserved the equipment, an
126 Id. at 169.
127 Banks ex rel. Banks v. Sunrise Hosp., 102 P.3d 52, 61 (Nev. 2004).
128 Id. at 62. Hedonic loss refers to testimony that “attempts to place a dollar value on either
‘lost enjoyment of life’ or ‘loss of society or relationship’.” Thomas R. Ireland, The Last of
Hedonic Damages: Nevada, New Mexico, and Running a Bluff, 16 J. LEGAL ECON. 91, 91
(2009) (discussing how Nevada and New Mexico are the only remaining “battleground
states” where expert testimony concerning hedonic damages has a chance of being
admissible).
129 Banks, 102 P.3d at 56–57.
130 Id. at 56.
131 Id. at 57.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 57–58.
137 Id. at 58.
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inspection would have indicated the machine was not operating properly.138
Following an initial hung jury, a second trial’s jury awarded Banks damages in
an amount of nearly five million dollars.139 Sunrise appealed, claiming numer-
ous errors including the admittance of expert testimony regarding a duty to
preserve the anesthesia equipment, opinion testimony concerning the equip-
ment malfunctioning, and testimony concerning hedonic damages.140
The Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in permit-
ting Banks’s experts to testify concerning Sunrise’s duty to preserve the anes-
thesia equipment.141 The Court found the evidence had assisted the jury in
understanding the critical issue of whether or not a malfunction had occurred
during the surgery.142 The Court noted that expert testimony was required to
establish a standard of care in medical malpractice cases, and the existence of a
duty to preserve the equipment was relevant to standard of care.143 In addition,
the Court found that expert Robert Morris’s testimony concerning the anesthe-
sia equipment malfunction was more than just speculative, and since the testi-
mony assisted the jury in understanding how the machines “could”
malfunction, the district court had not abused its discretion in permitting “opin-
ion testimony based on less than a reasonable degree of probability.”144 Mor-
ris’s testimony concerned what might have happened by explaining the possible
ways that such an anesthesia machine could malfunction; he also explained that
he could not determine what happened during Banks’s surgery since Sunrise
did not identify which machine it had used prior to selling that model of
machines.145 The Court found that this testimony established the possibility
that the particular anesthesia machine could have “malfunction[ed] intermit-
tently” and that it therefore aided the jury in understanding why it was reasona-
ble to draw an inference from Sunrise’s failed identification prior to sale.146
With regard to the testimony on hedonic damages, the Court aligned itself
with other jurisdictions that recognize that this type of specialized knowledge
can assist the jury in computing damages.147 Banks’s expert offered testimony
138 Id.
139 The jury in the second trial awarded $5,412,030 in damages totaling $6,903,044 after
adding prejudgment interest on past damages. Id. The district court then reduced the jury by
the 1.9 million that the co-defendant doctors had previously paid in a prior settlement, result-
ing in a final amount of $4,825,450. Id.
140 Id. at 60–61.
141 Id. at 60.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 61. In Morsicato v. Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc., the Supreme Court of Nevada stated
the finding in Banks related to the operation of medical equipment and should be narrowly
construed because “the standard of care and causation in a medical malpractice case . . . must
be based on testimony made to a reasonable degree of medical probability.” 111 P.3d 1112,
1115 (Nev. 2005).
145 Banks, 102 P.3d at 61. Morris went as far as stating, “‘[a]ny device can fail any time,’”
and “‘[e]veryone I have spoken to who had Narkomed 2s for any length of time experienced
failures in the interlock system.’” Id. (alteration in original).
146 Id.
147 Id. at 62. Hedonic damage models aim to put a meaningful and accurate measure on the
value of human life. Joseph A. Kuiper, Note, The Courts, Daubert, and Willingness-to-Pay:
The Doubtful Future of Hedonic Damages Testimony Under the Federal Rules of Evidence,
1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 1197, 1206 (1996). The willingness-to-pay theory “is founded on the
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that a total award could be determined by comparing figures derived from two
methods within a “willingness to pay” theory148: the “survey” method149 and a
“wage risk” method.150 The Court found that such methodology was within the
expert’s specialized knowledge and the testimony assisted the jury in under-
standing adequate compensation values for Banks’s loss of enjoyment of
life.151 Thus, the district court had exercised proper discretion in qualifying
Johnson as an expert, and Sunrise could have used traditional methods such as
cross-examination or providing its own witnesses to attack the expert’s reliabil-
ity.152 Some scholars viewed the Banks decision as one driven by “tragic cir-
cumstances.”153 In addition, other scholars viewed this decision as paving the
way for an “anything goes” approach concerning expert’s methodology for cal-
culating hedonic damages in Nevada.154 This can be troubling because courts
cannot take such an approach lightly, as hedonic damages for catastrophic inju-
ries can generate potentially enormous awards.155
F. Problematic Admissibility Considerations in Hallmark v. Eldridge
The Supreme Court of Nevada, like many other state courts, has been hesi-
tant to embrace Daubert fully, but it has come very close.156 In Hallmark  v.
Eldridge, the Supreme Court of Nevada reversed and remanded a judgment
because the district court abused its discretion by allowing testimony that did
not assist the jury in reaching a decision.157 In that case, biomechanical engi-
neer expert Dr. Bowles testified regarding the potential of forces in an acci-
dent.158 The plaintiff, Hallmark, had sued to recover damages for serious
personal injuries allegedly sustained when the defendant’s truck backed into the
plaintiff’s parked car.159 Dr. Bowles testified that a collision could not have
premise that the true value society places on human life can be determined by measuring the
expenditures individuals, government agencies, and businesses are willing to make or
require to reduce risks of injury or death.” Id.
148 Banks, 102 P.3d at 62–63. Johnson’s methodology determined that the tangible value of
a person’s life could be, at lowest, $2.5 million, with an average of $8.7 million and no
ceiling. Id. at 63.
149 The “survey” method involves asking people what amount they would be willing to pay
to reduce the probability of death. Id. at 63.
150 The “wage risk” method compares the salaries people in high fatality risk jobs receive
compared to the amount people will give up to work in lower risk jobs. Id.
151 Id. Although NRS 48.035 tempered admissibility, the probative value of the hedonic
damage testimony “was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Id.
at 62–63.
152 Id. at 63.
153 Nevada High Court Endorses “Hedonic” Damage Awards, NEV. L. BULL. (Erickson,
Thorpe & Swainston, Ltd., Reno, Nev.), Spring 2005, at 4, http://www.etsreno.com/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2011/01/June2005a.pdf. Scholars noted that traditionally courts only allow a
jury to draw an inference concerning suppression to situations where a party “willfully”
destroys evidence, which was very different from Sunrise Hospital’s conduct in Banks. Id.
154 See Ireland, supra note 128, at 94.
155 Erickson, Thorpe & Swainston, supra note 148, at 4.
156 Stempel, supra note 4, at 12.
157 Hallmark v. Eldridge, 189 P.3d 646, 655 (Nev. 2008).
158 Id. at 649.
159 Id. at 648. See supra Introduction for narration closely resembling the actual factual
background in Hallmark.
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caused the injuries to Hallmark’s spine, and instead diabetes, a pre-existing
condition, was the cause.160 Dr. Bowles formed his opinions by relying only on
an examination of the company truck, the court records, Hallmark’s medical
records, and photographs of Hallmark’s vehicle.161
The Court found that the district court did not err in qualifying Dr. Bowles
as an expert based on credentials.162 However, Dr. Bowles’s “testimony and
report did not assist the jury in understanding the evidence or in determining a
fact in issue.”163 The assistance requirement rooted in NRS 50.275164 hinged
on whether the testimony was “relevant and the product of reliable methodol-
ogy.”165 There was no evidence that Dr. Bowles’s opinions were capable of
being tested or had been tested, had been subject to peer review, or were gener-
ally accepted in the scientific community.166 The Court found the expert’s
opinions to be “highly speculative” and questioned their relevance, since they
were formed without knowledge of many pertinent factors167 and without any
attempt to re-create the accident.168
The Supreme Court of Nevada also relied on federal district court and
appellate court case law to support its finding that the state district court should
have excluded Dr. Bowles’s unreliable testimony.169 The Court cited Fourth
Circuit, Sixth Circuit, and Seventh Circuit cases as support for a finding that
Dr. Bowles’s testimony was “based more on supposition than science.”170 The
Supreme Court of Nevada ultimately concluded that the district court had
abused its discretion in admitting Dr. Bowles’s expert testimony “because his
testimony did not satisfy the ‘assistance’ requirement of NRS 50.275.”171
Commentators noted that the Hallmark decision closely tracked those con-
siderations in Daubert,172 a more than reasonable conclusion considering the
Court seemed to base its decision on “relevance” and “reliability,”173 the two
most critical components of the Daubert standard.174 Furthermore, Hallmark
applied the exact same factors for reliable methodology175 as those set out in
160 Hallmark, 189 P.3d at 649.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 651.
163 Id. at 652.
164 See infra Part IV.B (test of NRS 50.275).
165 Hallmark, 189 P.3d at 651 (footnote omitted).
166 Id. at 652.
167 Id. at 652–53. Dr. Bowles conceded to forming his opinion “without knowing (1) the
vehicles’ starting positions, (2) their speeds at impact, (3) the length of time that the vehicles
were in contact during impact, or (4) the angle at which the vehicles collided.” Id.
168 Id. at 653.
169 Id.
170 Id. at 653–54.
171 Id. at 654.
172 See Stempel, supra note 4, at 12.
173 Hallmark, 189 P.3d at 651.
174 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594–95 (1993).
175 Hallmark, 189 P.3d at 651–52. (“[A] district court should consider whether the opinion
is (1) within a recognized field of expertise; (2) testable and has been tested; (3) published
and subjected to peer review; (4) generally accepted in the scientific community (not always
determinative); and (5) based more on particularized facts rather than assumption, conjec-
ture, or generalization.” (footnotes omitted))
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Daubert.176 Additionally, Hallmark used federal appellate court cases to sup-
port its finding of an abuse of discretion in state court.177 Eventually, the Court
tied back the holding to NRS 50.275, but only after a separate in-depth analysis
that shared many Daubert considerations.178 It is no wonder why future com-
mentators, scholars,179 and litigants came to interpret the Hallmark decision as
an adoption of the Daubert standard.180 Nevada’s admissibility standard defi-
nitely needed clarification.
III. HIGGS V. STATE
In Higgs v. State, the Supreme Court of Nevada reaffirmed and attempted
to clarify Nevada’s standard for expert testimony.181 In Higgs, the defendant
appealed his first-degree murder conviction on multiple grounds.182 Higgs had
allegedly poisoned his wife Augustine by injecting her with succinylcholine.183
Kim Ramey, a critical care nurse who worked with Higgs, had multiple conver-
sations with Higgs on July 7, 2006, that became critical to the state’s case.184
Higgs had shared with Ramey that he was having marital problems and
intended to seek a divorce.185 That same day, Higgs brought up a widely publi-
cized homicide case involving a husband killing his wife and had commented,
“That guy did it wrong. If you want to get rid of someone, you just hit them
with a little succ[inylcholine] because they can’t trace it [postmortem].”186
In the early morning of July 8, 2006, Higgs called emergency personnel to
his home, claiming to have found his wife unresponsive.187 Upon learning of
Augustine’s hospital admittance, Ramey informed a colleague of her previous
conversations with Higgs.188 Soon Augustine’s attending physician was up to
speed and obtained a urine sample from Augustine before the doctors removed
her from life support a few days later.189 The hospital’s toxicology testing and
the coroner’s analysis of postmortem tissue samples showed no signs of suc-
cinylcholine, but specimens sent to the FBI tested positive for succinylcholine
and succinylmonocholine.190 On appeal, Higgs challenged the admittance of
176 See supra note 30 for a list of Daubert reliable methodology factors.
177 Hallmark, 189 P.3d at 653–54.
178 Id. at 654.
179 See Stempel, supra note 4, at 12.
180 Jennifer L. Braster, Expert Testimony in the Wake of Hallmark and Higgs—Has the
Supreme Court of Nevada Adopted Daubert?, COMMUNIQU ´E, Jan. 2011, at 30, 30.
181 Higgs v. State, 222 P.3d 648, 650 (Nev. 2010).
182 Id. at 653–55.
183 Id. at 650. Succinylcholine, the alleged cause of death, “‘is a very unstable compound
that breaks down rapidly to produce succinylmonocholine, a less unstable compound that
breaks down to form succinic acid and choline, which are naturally present in the human
body.’” Id. at 650 n.2 (quoting Sybers v. State, 841 So. 2d 532, 542 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2003)). Higgs, an experienced nurse, had access to succinylcholine through his employment.
Id. at 650–51.
184 Id. at 650.
185 Id.
186 Id. (second alteration in original).
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Id.
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the FBI toxicologist’s expert testimony regarding succinylcholine testing and
urged the Court to adopt the federal admissibility standard.191
The Supreme Court of Nevada flatly rejected the notion that the Hallmark
decision had adopted the Daubert standard.192 The Court declined adoption and
sought to avoid the rigid application of enumerated Daubert factors.193 It noted
that gatekeepers would encounter an overlap of factors concerning relevancy
and reliability, but that Daubert is persuasive only in its promotion of a flexible
approach.194 The Court also clarified that “NRS 50.275 is the blueprint for the
admissibility of expert witness testimony” in Nevada,195 then discussed the dif-
ferences between NRS 50.275 and FRE 702.196
Higgs identified three overarching requirements pursuant to NRS 50.275:
qualification, assistance, and limited scope.197 The Court also noted two bene-
fits to its approach: it gives judges wide discretion, and it permits an inquiry
based on the law rather than upon scientific principles198—a benefit in accor-
dance with Chief Justice Rehnquist’s cautionary dissent from Daubert.199 The
Court explained the requirements do not force a judge to determine either sci-
entific falsifiability or an error rate, two notably difficult factors for judges to
evaluate.200 Additionally, within the confines of NRS 50.275, there remains a
degree of regulation upon testimony admittance so the rule does not usurp “the
trial judge’s gatekeeping function.”201
Higgs considered various factors for each of the three overarching require-
ments of NRS 50.275.202 Qualification factors include whether an expert has
“formal schooling, proper licensure, employment experience, and practical
experience and specialized training.”203 The assistance requirement goes to the
relevancy of the opinion and reliability of the methodology.204 Reliable meth-
odology factors include whether the “opinion is (1) within a recognized field of
expertise; (2) testable and has been tested; (3) published and subjected to peer
review; (4) generally accepted in the scientific community (not always determi-
native); and (5) based on more particularized facts rather than assumption, con-
jecture, or generalization.”205 Limited scope requirements include assessing
191 Id. at 655 (noting Higgs’ invitation for the Court to adopt the Frye or Daubert standard,
under which the Court presumably would hold inadmissible the FBI expert’s testimony
regarding succinylcholine, the cause of death).
192 Id. at 650.
193 Id. at 657–58 (re-affirming flexibility within Nevada state courts in not limiting
considerations).
194 Id.
195 Id. at 658.
196 See infra Part IV.B.
197 Higgs, 222 P.3d at 658 (citing Hallmark v. Eldridge, 189 P.3d 646, 650 (Nev. 2008)).
198 Id. at 659.
199 Daubert, 509 U.S. 598, 601 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
200 Higgs, 222 P.3d at 659. In a footnote, the Court briefly discussed the studies that show
judiciary difficulty in understanding the falsifiability factor from Daubert. See id. at 659 n.5.
201 Id. at 658–59.
202 Id. at 659–60.
203 Id. at 659.
204 Id. at 660.
205 Id. (quoting Hallmark v. Eldridge, 189 P.3d 646, 651–52 (Nev. 2008)).
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whether the testimony consists of highly particularized facts and is limited to
matters within the scope of the expert’s knowledge.206
Ultimately, the Court concluded that the district court did not abuse its
discretion when it allowed the FBI toxicologist to testify about the procedures
and methodologies used in testing for the presence of succinylcholine within
the victim.207
IV. ANALYSIS OF HIGGS AND PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS
Because the standard for expert witness admissibility, as re-affirmed in
Higgs, leaves judges wide discretion208 concerning how to apply a non-exhaus-
tive list of multiple factors, the standard will likely result in inconsistent and
unpredictable application. What little guidance the Court left for judges to
assess the qualification, assistance, and limited scope requirements did not pro-
vide for a clear test or analysis that future courts should undertake. Subsequent
to Higgs, the Court noted that it had “expressly rejected the adoption of federal
authority that employs mechanical application of factors regarding qualifica-
tions of expert witnesses.”209 Thus, without a clear test to guide future courts,
the Supreme Court of Nevada must further clarify the analysis it expects courts
to undertake to address the true implications and impact on future expert testi-
mony within the state.
The following analysis of Higgs first looks at the possible ramifications of
an admissibility standard with so many similarities to Daubert, the finality of
an abuse of discretion review standard, and the real potential to waste judicial
resources. Next, the analysis turns to the option of achieving a workable frame-
work within NRS 50.275 that incorporates the Court’s objectives as set out in
Higgs.
A. Ramifications of the Higgs v. State Standard
The Supreme Court of Nevada in Higgs aimed at reaffirming the standard
for admissibility of expert witness testimony in Nevada, yet further compli-
cated its application. In comparing the Nevada standard to the disadvantages of
Daubert, Higgs cited multiple circuit court opinions as examples of the incon-
sistent use of Daubert factors.210 Despite trying to avoid a Daubert-type list of
factors, Higgs applied a non-exhaustive list of an even greater number of fac-
tors for the judiciary’s general guidance, to be applied as necessary on a case-
to-case basis.211 The Court gave absolute discretion to trial court judges by
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 Cramer v. State, Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 240 P.3d 8, 12 (Nev. 2010) (discussing that
after Higgs a district court judge has “wide discretion” regarding “gatekeep[ing]” duties and
holding an affidavit inadmissible to prove a person’s blood alcohol content when the affida-
vit had come from a person who had not previously been qualified as an expert in district
court (internal quotation marks omitted)).
209 Bahena v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 235 P.3d 592, 596 n.4 (Nev. 2010) (clarifying
the Supreme Court of Nevada’s rationale in not adopting a standard of review for discovery
sanctions that tracked federal authority when such review contradicted Nevada state law).
210 Higgs, 222 P.3d at 657.
211 Id. at 659–60.
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allowing them to decide which of the many factors to consider.212 Many liti-
gants want certainty and judges need guidance.213
Another reason Higgs declined to adopt Daubert was to limit judges’
inquiries to the law rather than science,214 but the Higgs standard is vulnerable
to many of the same weaknesses commentators have criticized in the Daubert
standard.215 Such a high level of flexibility based on legal inquiry raises con-
cerns regarding the admittance of junk science or inconsistent decisions.216 The
Court recently categorized the Higgs standard as an even “more deferential and
flexible standard” than that of Daubert.217
Though commentators criticized the lack of clarity regarding the applica-
tion of the four non-exhaustive Daubert factors,218 the Higgs standard contains
an excess of ten factors for judges’ consideration with little direction as to
whether and how to assess the three overarching requirements of qualification,
assisting the jury, and scope.219 The Supreme Court of Nevada’s denunciation
of Daubert was inconsistent with the standard it espoused; the Court empha-
sized relevance and reliability in methodology as the cornerstones of its “assist-
ing a jury” requirement,220 but those concepts directly overlap the Daubert
factors.221
The need for further clarification is even more apparent when one consid-
ers that the level of review is abuse of discretion. Trial court judges cannot
guess at how to apply factors with so much at stake. It will be nearly unattaina-
ble for a defendant to demonstrate abuse of discretion, and it would only occur
because of a rare instance where the district court might apply an incorrect law,
212 Id. at 659.
213 Note, Reliable Evaluation, supra note 26, at 2163.
214 Higgs, 222 P.3d at 659.
215 Commentators point out that the Higgs decision teaches attorneys to “always check the
controlling jurisdiction’s laws first.” Braster, supra note 180, at 31. It could be the difference
of getting an expert admitted. Id.
216 See Welch, supra note 21, at 1094 (discussing the flexibility of the four Daubert factors
raising junk science concerns and inconsistent application). But see Stempel, supra note 4, at
13 (concluding that “[a]lthough Higgs marks a withdrawal from Hallmark, in favor of tradi-
tional Nevada expert evidence law rather than an implicit embrace of the federal Daubert
standard, the Higgs precedent, as applied in Thomas, demonstrates that the Nevada Supreme
Court and state trial courts retain substantial power to limit the admissibility of expert evi-
dence seen as suspect or misleading”). In Thomas v. Hardwick, the Supreme Court of
Nevada declined to equate “recall bias” with previously admitted testimony concerning the
flaws in cross-cultural eyewitness identification. 231 P.3d 1111, 1119 (Nev. 2010). “Recall
bias” is the human tendency to recall with greater certainty the details of events leading up to
a rare outcome. Id. The Court found no published case admitting recall bias testimony to
attack a lone witness’s credibility, and determined that “recall bias testimony invades the
province of the jury and seems unhelpful.” Id. Even though Higgs is more flexible than the
federal standard, recall bias testimony was inadmissible specifically because it would not
assist the jury. Id. at 1119 n.10.
217 Thomas, 231 P.3d at 1119 n.10.
218 Welch, supra note 21, at 1094.
219 See Higgs, 222 P.3d at 659–60.
220 Id. at 660.
221 Id. at 658 (discussing “the inevitable overlap of [federal] factors [Nevada judges] will
consider, mainly relevance and reliability”).
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follow the “wrong procedure,” or commit a “clear error in judgment.”222 The
Supreme Court of Nevada will likely find it difficult to overrule the district
courts because the lack of clarification leaves little certainty regarding what
constitutes a mistake; therefore, the trial courts will exercise sole discretion, in
likely inconsistent admissibility decisions, because it is virtually impossible to
tell what constitutes an abuse of discretion in this area.223
Finally, some commentators praised Nevada’s initial rejection of Daubert
prior to Higgs because of the potential to conserve judicial resources by limit-
ing pre-trial motions that tactically attempted to use the complex federal admis-
sibility standard as a “sword” to limit non-favorable evidence.224 However, the
Higgs decision presents numerous flexible factors without providing clarity as
to their application, and this may lead to the waste of judicial resources. With
uncertainty as to the factors’ relative weight or application, pre-trial motions
may increase as parties attempt to challenge the requirements, which in turn
will lengthen district court trials and waste judicial resources.225
In the current economic crisis, no state court can afford to waste judicial
resources, especially Nevada.226 Nevada is one of only ten states that do not
have a state intermediate appellate court.227 Amazingly, Nevada has the highest
population of any state without an intermediate state court.228 Only the
Supreme Court of Nevada has the jurisdiction to hear appeals from district
courts, and both levels of Nevada courts have recently seen a tremendous
increase in filings.229 The number of district court judges continues to increase,
while the size of the Supreme Court of Nevada remains at seven justices.230
With one of the highest caseloads in the country, the Supreme Court of Nevada
handles nearly two thousand new filings a year and two to three times the
caseload amount of many other state high courts.231 With the Supreme Court of
Nevada handling such a heavy caseload under an abuse of discretion standard,
222 Welch, supra note 21, at 1093 (quoting United States v. Brown, 415 F.3d 1257, 1266
(11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1023 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
223 Id.
224 See White, supra note 2, at 32 (discussing Nevada’s non-adoption of Daubert having the
potential to conserve judicial resources and avoid trying the causation portion of a case
twice).
225 See id.
226 During a joint session of the Nevada Senate and Assembly, Michael Douglas, Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of Nevada, expressed that the Court would continue to “do
more with less.” Geoff Dornan, Douglas Touts Virtues of Specialty Courts Cut in Sandoval
Budget, NEV. APPEAL, Mar. 8, 2011 (internal quotation marks omitted), http://www.nevada
appeal.com/article/20110308/NEWS/110309691. Douglas went on to explain that, like other
branches of the government, courts have made tough choices when balancing their budget.
Id. The Supreme Court of Nevada’s newest proposed budget is “16.87 percent or $2.36
million less than the current budget.” Id. Douglas emphasized that Nevada state courts
“understand Nevada is at crossroads.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
227 See Tami D. Cowden, A Nevada Court of Appeals: The Time Has Come, COMMUNIQU ´E,
Oct. 2010, at 22, 22, available at http://www.clarkcountybar.org/index.php.
228 Id. at 23. Among states without an intermediate court, Nevada and West Virginia are the
only states that do not rank “in the bottom fifth of the states in terms of population.” Id.
229 Id. at 22.
230 Id.
231 Id.
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district court judges will likely get only one shot at a proper ruling and must
have a consistent expert admissibility standard to work with.
B. Achieving a Workable Framework Within NRS 50.275
There is no better place than NRS 50.275 to incorporate the Supreme
Court of Nevada’s objectives as set out in Higgs. Higgs noted that NRS 50.275
differs from FRE 702 in its level of discretion.232 The language in NRS 50.275
states: “If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by special knowledge, skill, experience, training or edu-
cation may testify to matters within the scope of such knowledge.”233
FRE 702 contains nearly identical information but has some slight differ-
ences and includes additional conditions:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by special knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify to
matters within thereto in the scope form of such knowledge an opinion or otherwise,
if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the
product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the prin-
ciples and methods reliably to the facts of the case.234
The language in NRS 50.275 should mirror the Supreme Court of
Nevada’s objectives in Higgs. If Nevada judges must focus on three overarch-
ing requirements, those requirements cannot remain buried in a state law that so
closely resembles FRE 702 when Higgs held the Daubert standard persuasive
only in its approach to flexibility.235 Just as North Dakota has held strong to its
own standard giving more discretion to juries,236 Nevada should take action
that truly separates itself from the rigid federal standard Higgs condemns.237
The Nevada Legislature could amend NRS 50.275 to include additional
considerations set out in Higgs, just as the FRE did following Daubert.238 Such
an action would be similar to Missouri’s action in adding its own additional
language to MRS 490.065 after the Supreme Court of Missouri found other
factors critical to its own expert witness standard.239 Nevada too can be fluid in
its statutory construction and can adjust to recent development in case law.
The Nevada standard would have increased clarity if the Legislature adds
additional conditions to NRS 50.275 that give guidance regarding the relative
weight to each of the overarching requirements and the factors within. The
Nevada Revised Statutes can provide a framework that will result in more con-
sistent and predictable application. For example, the Nevada Legislature could
amend NRS 50.275 to read:
232 Higgs v. State, 222 P.3d 648, 659 (Nev. 2010).
233 NEV. REV. STAT. § 50.275 (2009).
234 Braster, supra note 180, at 30 (italicized text (the additional conditions in FRE 702) and
marked text displays the differences between NRS 50.275 and FRE 702); see FED. R. EVID.
702.
235 Higgs, 222 P.3d at 657.
236 See supra, Part II.C.
237 See Higgs, 222 P.3d at 657.
238 Id. at 659.
239 See Murphy & McFerron, supra note 78, at 86–87.
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Judges will assess the equally weighted requirements: (1) qualification, (2) assis-
tance, and (3) limited scope based primarily on legal principles and apply relevant
factors concerning each requirement flexibly in neither a non-determinative nor a
rigid fashion. Discretion must stay within the parameters of this statute, and an expert
witness must meet all three overarching requirements to the certainty of a reasonable
gatekeeper.
While far from perfect, such additional conditions and language along
these lines would incorporate many of the Court’s objectives from Higgs, while
providing guidance to make the standard’s application more consistent and pre-
dictable.240 An amended NRS 50.275 that included more definite factors would
be better than the current vague standard.241 Higgs made clear that Nevada
wanted to separate and differentiate itself from Daubert and the federal stan-
dard; Nevada must do more than just discuss change. If the overarching Higgs
requirements must each be met and if courts weighed them equally, practition-
ers would have greater certainty regarding the importance of a particular expert
witness’s testimony, which would lead to more consistent and straightforward
evidentiary motions. The key reason for these changes is that unstructured ad
hoc balancing tests are difficult for anyone to apply well, even judges, and a
more clarified standard would be likely to “produce more consistent outcomes
with less effort and little loss in accuracy” within Nevada cases.242
V. CONCLUSION
No one has suggested that finding a balance of consistency and flexibility
in expert witness admissibility while maintaining notions of due process and
efficiency will ever be easy. Expert witness standards will continue to be the
topic of debate and commentary within federal and state court systems for years
to come. There will always be room for improvement anytime judges have
discretion to influence a trial by admitting expert testimony.243 Each jurisdic-
tion has its own objectives when it comes to this enigma.
The Supreme Court of Nevada in Higgs re-affirmed the law regarding the
admissibility of expert witness testimony.244 In declining to adopt Daubert, the
240 There are many people who will always meet proposals for change with a degree of
criticism and/or skepticism, especially when dealing with well-established evidentiary stan-
dards. In the federal context, commentators and scholars alike have offered an extremely
wide range of suggested alternatives to the current admissibility standards. Examples
include, “educating law students and judges on science issues; forming collaborations
between scientific and legal institutions; using court-appointed science experts in judicial
proceedings; . . . reforming forensic science practices themselves;” and even having the
Court decide admissibility solely on relevancy while repealing FRE 702 or similar state
laws. Note, Admitting Doubt, supra note 6, at 2033–34 (footnotes omitted). Others have
recommended a taxonomy approach that treats particular forms of expertise differently with
categorizations further refined through common law development. Note, Reliable Evalua-
tion, supra note 26, at 2163.
241 See Kaye, supra note 15, at 1944.
242 Id. (citing the following as examples reinforcing such a principle: Richard A. Epstein,
The Risks of Risk/Utility, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 469 (1987); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Stan-
dards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral
Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23 (2000)).
243 See Stempel, supra note 4, at 11 (discussing the importance of expert testimony).
244 Higgs v. State, 222 P.3d 648, 659 (Nev. 2010).
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Court sought to prevent future courts from rigidly applying a list of enumerated
factors.245 The Court was concerned with maintaining wide discretion in which
judges base their inquiry upon legal rather than scientific principles, while
avoiding the downfalls of Daubert.246 However, the Court’s focus on these two
goals obscures the standard’s true impacts, which may result in inconsistent and
unpredictable application. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Nevada should fur-
ther clarify the admissibility standard to provide district court judges with more
specific guidance in its application.247 Moreover, the Nevada Legislature
should consider incorporating a framework into NRS 50.275 through the addi-
tion of conditions that mirror the Court’s concerns in Higgs. Only when NRS
50.275 incorporates Higgs’s qualification, assistance, and limited scope
requirements248 into its language can the statute truly serve as the state’s
“blueprint.”249
245 Id. at 657; Braster, supra note 180, at 30.
246 Higgs, 222 P.3d at 659.
247 For a recent example of the Supreme Court of Nevada’s  application of its expert witness
standard concerning  a consolidated writ petition, see Williams v. Eight Judicial Dist. Court,
262 P.3d 360, 369 (Nev. 2011). In Williams, writ petitions arose out of two separate actions
concerning the Hepatitis C outbreak at the Endoscopy Center of Southern Nevada
(“ECSN”). Id. at 363. In both cases, the plaintiffs sued the defendants “for strict products
liability including design defect, failure to warn, and breach of implied warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose.” Id. Further, plaintiffs alleged that ECSN medical personnel
“injected needles contaminated with hepatitis into vials of Propofol.” Id. Allegedly, in re-
using the vials, the personnel injected plaintiffs with the now contaminated Propofol. Id. The
defendants obtained multiple experts to rebut these claims including a registered nurse and a
professor of medicine. Id. Both experts opined that the clinic’s improper cleaning and disin-
fection techniques may have caused the plaintiffs contraction of hepatitis C, yet neither
expert attributed a particular piece of equipment to hepatitis C transmittal. Id. Concerning
the nurse’s testimony, when faced with motions in limine, the district courts came to differ-
ent conclusions concerning admissibility. Id. Opposite admissibility results involving the
same expert in nearly identical cases exemplifies the true potential for district courts’ unpre-
dictable and inconsistent application of Nevada’s current expert witness standard. The
Supreme Court of Nevada ultimately held that the nurse “may testify within his area of
expertise,” but because he did not possess the requisite qualification, “he may not testify as
to medical causation.” Id. at 369–70.
248 Higgs, 222 P.3d.at 658.
249 See id. (re-affirming that NRS 50.275 is the “blueprint” for the admissibility of expert
witnesses in Nevada).
